No, far from it. Engels (in)famous essay "On Authority" is often pointed to by Marxists of various schools as refuting anarchism. Indeed, it is often considered the essential Marxist work for this and is often trotted out (pun intended) when anarchist influence is on the rise. However this is not the case. In fact, his essay is both politically flawed and misrepresentative of his foes opinions. As such, anarchists do not think that Engels refuted anarchism in his essay. Indeed, rather than refute anarchism, Engels' essay just shows his ignorance of the ideas he was critiquing. This ignorance essentially rests on the fact that the whole concept of authority was defined and understood differently by Bakunin and Engels meant that the latter's critique was flawed. While Engels may have thought that they both were speaking of the same thing, in fact they were not.
For Engels, all forms of group activity meant the subjection of the individuals that make it up. As he puts it, "whoever mentions combined action speaks of organisation" and so it is not possible "to have organisation without authority," as authority means "the imposition of the will of another upon ours . . . authority presupposes subordination." [Marx-Engels Reader, p. 731 and p. 730] As such, he considers the ideas of Bakunin to fly in the face of common sense and so show that he does not know what he is talking about. However, it is Engels who shows that he does not know what he is talking about.
The first fallacy in Engels account is that anarchists do not oppose all forms of authority. Bakunin was extremely clear on this issue and differentiated between types of authority, of which only certain kinds did he oppose. For example, he asked the question "[d]oes it follow that I reject all authority?" and answered quite clearly: "No, far be it from me to entertain such a thought." He acknowledged the difference between being an authority -- an expert -- and being in authority, for example. This meant that "[i]f I bow before the authority of the specialists and declare myself ready to follow, to a certain extent and so long as it may seem to me to be necessary, their general indications and even their directions, it is because their authority is imposed upon me by no one . . . I bow before the authority of specialists because it is imposed upon me by my own reason." [The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, p. 253]
Similarly, he argued that anarchists "recognise all natural authority, and all influence of fact upon us, but none of right; for all authority and all influence of right, officially imposed upon us, immediately becomes a falsehood and an oppression." He stressed that the "only great and omnipotent authority, at once natural and rational, the only one we respect, will be that of the collective and public spirit of a society founded on equality and solidarity and the mutual respect of all its members." [Op. Cit., p. 241 and p. 255]
So while Bakunin and other anarchists, on occasion, did argue that anarchists reject "all authority" they, as Carole Pateman correctly notes, "tended to treat 'authority' as a synonym for 'authoritarian,' and so have identified 'authority' with hierarchical power structures, especially those of the state. Nevertheless, their practical proposals and some of their theoretical discussions present a different picture." [The Problem of Political Obligation, p. 141] This can be seen when Bakunin noted that "the principle of authority" was the "eminently theological, metaphysical and political idea that the masses, always incapable of governing themselves, must submit at all times to the benevolent yoke of a wisdom and a justice, which in one way or another, is imposed from above." [Marxism, Freedom and the State, p. 33] Clearly, by the term "principle of authority" Bakunin meant hierarchy rather than organisation and the need to make agreements (what is now called self-management).
Therefore Bakunin did not oppose all authority but rather a specific kind of authority, namely hierarchical authority. This kind of authority placed power into the hands of a few. For example, wage labour produced this kind of authority, with a "meeting . . . between master and slave . . . the worker sells his person and his liberty for a given time." [The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, p. 187] The state is also based hierarchical authority, with "those who govern" (i.e. "those who frame the laws of the country as well as those who exercise the executive power") are in an "exceptional position diametrically opposed to . . . popular aspirations" towards liberty. They end up "viewing society from the high position in which they find themselves" and so "[w]hoever says political power says domination" over "a more or less considerable section of the population." [Op. Cit., p. 218]
Thus hierarchical authority is top-down, centralised and imposed. It is this kind of authority Bakunin had in mind when he argued that anarchists "are in fact enemies of all authority" and it will "corrupt those who exercise [it] as much as those who are compelled to submit to [it]." [Op. Cit., p. 249] In other words, "authority" was used as shorthand for "hierarchy" (or "hierarchical authority"), the imposition of decisions rather than agreement to abide by the collective decisions you make with others when you freely associate with them. In place of this kind of authority, Bakunin proposed a "natural authority" based on the masses "governing themselves." He did not object to the need for individuals associating themselves into groups and managing their own affairs, rather he opposed the idea that co-operation necessitated hierarchy:
"Hence there results, for science as well as for industry, the necessity of division and association of labour. I take and I give -- such is human life. Each is an authoritative leader and in turn is led by others. Accordingly there is no fixed and constant authority, but continual exchange of mutual, temporary, and, above all, voluntary authority and subordination." [Op. Cit., pp. 353-4]
This kind of free association would be the expression of liberty rather than (as in hierarchical structures) its denial. Anarchists reject the idea of giving a minority (a government) the power to make our decisions for us. Rather, power should rest in the hands of all, not concentrated in the hands of a few. Anarchism is based on rejecting what Bakunin called "the authoritarian conception of discipline" which "always signifies despotism on the one hand and blind automatic submission to authority on the other." In an anarchist organisation "hierarchic order and advancement do not exist" and there would be "voluntary and thoughtful discipline" for "collective work or action." This would be a new kind of discipline, one which is "voluntary and intelligently understood" and "necessary whenever a greater number of individuals undertake any kind of collective work or action." This is "simply the voluntary and considered co-ordination of all individual efforts for a common purpose . . In such a system, power, properly speaking, no longer exists. Power is diffused to the collectivity and becomes the true expression of the liberty of everyone, the faithful and sincere realisation of the will of all . . . this is the only true discipline, the discipline necessary for the organisation of freedom." [Op. Cit., pp. 259-60]
Clearly Engels misunderstands the anarchist conception of liberty. Rather than seeing it as essentially negative, anarchists argue that liberty is expressed in two different, but integrated, ways. Firstly, there is rebellion, the expression of autonomy in the face of authority. This is the negative aspect of it. Secondly, there is association, the expression of autonomy by working with equals. This is the positive aspect of it. As such, Engels concentrates on the negative aspect of anarchist ideas, ignoring the positive, and so paints a false picture of anarchism. Freedom, as Bakunin argued, is a product of connection, not of isolation. How a group organises itself determines whether it is authoritarian or libertarian. If the individuals who take part in a group manage the affairs of that group (including what kinds of decisions can be delegated) then that group is based on liberty. If that power is left to a few individuals (whether elected or not) then that group is structured in an authoritarian manner. This can be seen from Bakunin's argument that power must be "diffused" into the collective in an anarchist society. Clearly, anarchists do not reject the need for organisation nor the need to make and abide by collective decisions. Rather, the question is how these decisions are to be made -- are they to be made from below, by those affected by them, or from above, imposed by a few people in authority.
Only a sophist would confuse hierarchical power with the power of people managing their own affairs. It is an improper use of words to denote equally as "authority" two such opposed concepts as individuals subjected to the autocratic power of a boss and the voluntary co-operation of conscious individuals working together as equals. The lifeless obedience of a governed mass cannot be compared to the organised co-operation of free individuals, yet this is what Engels does. The former is marked by hierarchical power and the turning of the subjected into automations performing mechanical movements without will and thought. The latter is marked by participation, discussion and agreement. Both are, of course, based on co-operation but to argue that latter restricts liberty as much as the former simply confuses co-operation with coercion. It also indicates a distinctly liberal conception of liberty, seeing it restricted by association with others rather than seeing association as an expression of liberty. As Malatesta argued:
"The basic error . . . is in believing that organisation is not possible without authority."Now, it seems to us that organisation, that is to say, association for a specific purpose and with the structure and means required to attain it, is a necessary aspect of social life. A man in isolation cannot even live the life of a beast . . . Having therefore to join with other humans . . . he must submit to the will of others (be enslaved) or subject others to his will (be in authority) or live with others in fraternal agreement in the interests of the greatest good of all (be an associate). Nobody can escape from this necessity." [Life and Ideas, pp. 84-5]
Therefore, organisation is "only the practice of co-operation and solidarity" and is a "natural and necessary condition of social life." [Malatesta, Op. Cit., p. 83] Clearly, the question is not whether we organise, but how do we do so. This means that, for anarchists, Engels confused vastly different concepts: "Co-ordination is dutifully confused with command, organisation with hierarchy, agreement with domination -- indeed, 'imperious' domination." [Murray Bookchin, Towards an Ecological Society, pp. 126-7]
Socialism will only exist when the discipline currently enforced by the stick in the hand of the boss is replaced by the conscious self-discipline of free individuals. It is not by changing who holds the stick (from a capitalist to a "socialist" boss) that socialism will be created. It is only by the breaking up and uprooting of this slavish spirit of discipline, and its replacement by self-management, that working people will create a new discipline what will be the basis of socialism (the voluntary self-discipline Bakunin talked about).
Clearly, then, Engels did not refute anarchism by his essay. Rather, he refuted a straw man of his own creation. The question was never one of whether certain tasks need co-operation, co-ordination, joint activity and agreement. It was, in fact, a question of how that is achieved. As such, Engels diatribe misses the point. Instead of addressing the actual politics of anarchism or their actual use of the word "authority," he rather addresses a series of logical deductions he draws from a false assumption regarding those politics. Engels essay shows the bedlam that can be created when a remorseless logician deduces away from an incorrect starting assumption.
For collective activity anarchists recognise the need to make and stick by agreements. Collective activity of course needs collective decision making and organisation. In so far as Engels had a point to his diatribe (namely that group efforts meant co-operating with others), Bakunin (like any anarchist) would have agreed. The question was how are these decisions to be made, not whether they should be or not. Ultimately, Engels confused agreement with hierarchy. Anarchists do not.
Engels argument in "On Authority" can be summed up as any form
of collective activity means co-operating with others and that
this means the individual subordinates themselves to others,
specifically the group. As such, authority cannot be abolished
as organisation means that "the will of a single individual
will always have to subordinate itself, which means that
questions are settled in an authoritarian way." [Op. Cit.,
p. 731]
As such, Engels argument proves too much. As every form of
joint activity involves agreement and "subordination," then
life itself becomes "authoritarian." The only free person,
according to Engels' logic, would be the hermit. As George
Barrett argues:
"If we are going to invent a dogma that to make agreements is
to damage freedom, then at once freedom becomes tyrannical, for
it forbids men [and women] to take the most ordinary everyday
pleasures. For example, I cannot go for a walk with my friend
because it is against the principle of Liberty that I should
agree to be at a certain place at a certain time to meet him.
I cannot in the least extend my own power beyond myself,
because to do so I must co-operate with someone else, and
co-operation implies an agreement, and that is against
Liberty. It will be seen at once that this argument is
absurd. I do not limit my liberty, but simply exercise it,
when I agree with my friend to go for a walk.
"If, on the other hand, I decide from my superior knowledge
that it is good for my friend to take exercise, and therefore
I attempt to compel him to go for a walk, then I begin to limit
freedom. This is the difference between free agreement and
government." [Objections to Anarchism]
So, if we took Engels' argument seriously, then we would have
to conclude that living makes freedom impossible! After all
by doing any joint activity you "subordinate" yourself to
others and, ironically, exercising your liberty by making
decisions and associating with others would become a denial
of liberty. Clearly Engels argument is lacking something!
Perhaps this paradox can be explained once we recognise
that Engels is using a distinctly liberal view of freedom
-- i.e. freedom from. Anarchists reject this. We see
freedom as holistic -- freedom from and freedom to. This
means that that freedom is maintained by the kind of
relationships we form with others, not by isolation.
Liberty is denied when we form hierarchical relationships
with others not necessarily when we associate with others.
To combine with other individuals is an expression of
individual liberty, not its denial! We are aware that
freedom is impossible outside of association. Within an
association absolute "autonomy" cannot exist, but such
a concept of "autonomy" would restrict freedom to such a
degree that it would be so self-defeating as to make a
mockery of the concept of autonomy and no sane person
would seek it.
Clearly, Engels "critique" hides more than it explains. Yes,
co-operation and coercion both involve people working jointly
together, but they are not to be equated. While Bakunin
recognised this fundamental difference and tried, perhaps
incompletely, to differentiate them (by arguing against
"the principle of authority") and to base his politics on
the difference, Engels obscures the differences and muddies
the water by confusing the two radically different concepts
within the word "authority."
Any organisation or group is based on co-operation and
co-ordination (Engels' "principle of authority"). How
that co-operation is achieved is dependent on the
type of organisation in question and that, in turn,
specifies the social relationships within it. It is
these social relationships which determine whether
an organisation is authoritarian or libertarian, not the
universal need to make and stick by agreements. Engels is
simply confusing obedience with agreement, coercion with
co-operation, organisation with authority, objective
reality with despotism.
As such, rather than seeing organisation as restricting
freedom, anarchists argue that the kind of organisation
we create is what matters. We can form relationships with
others which are based on equality, not subordination. As
an example, we point to the differences between marriage
and free love (see
next section). Once it is recognised
that decisions can be made on the basis of agreements
between equals, Engels essay can be seen for what it is --
a deeply flawed piece of cheap and inaccurate diatribe.
Engels, let us not forget, argues, in effect, any activities which
"replace isolated action by combined action of individuals"
means "the imposition of the will of another upon ours" and so
"the will of the single individual will have to subordinate itself,
which means that questions are settled in an authoritarian manner."
This, for Engels, means that "authority" has not "disappeared"
under anarchism but rather it has only "changed its form."
[Op. Cit., pp. 730-1]
However, to say that authority just changes its form misses
the qualitative differences between authoritarian and
libertarian organisation. Precisely the differences which
Bakunin and other anarchists tried to stress by calling
themselves anti-authoritarians and being against the
"principle of authority." By arguing that all forms of
association are necessarily "authoritarian," Engels is
impoverishing the liberatory potential of socialism. He
ensures that the key question of liberty within our
associations is hidden behind a mass of sophistry.
As an example, look at the difference between marriage
and free love. Both forms necessitate two individuals
living together, sharing the same home, organising their
lives together. The same situation and the same commitments.
But do both imply the same social relationships? Are they
both "authoritarian"?
Traditionally, the marriage vow is based on the wife promising
to obey the husband. Her role is simply that of obedience (in
theory, at least). As Carole Pateman argues, "[u]ntil late
into the nineteenth century the legal and civil position of
a wife resembled that of a slave" and, in theory, "became the
property of her husband and stood to him as a slave/servant
to a master." [The Sexual Contract, p. 119 and pp. 130-1]
As such, an obvious social relationship exists -- an
authoritarian one in which the man has power over the woman.
We have a relationship based on domination and subordination.
In free love, the couple are equals. They decide their own affairs,
together. The decisions they reach are agreed between them and no
domination takes place (unless you think making an agreement
equals domination or subordination). They both agree to the
decisions they reach, based on mutual respect and give and take.
Subordination to individuals does not meaningfully exist (at
best, it could be argued that both parties are "dominated" by
their decisions, hardly a meaningful use of the word). Instead
of subordination, there is free agreement.
Both types of organisation apply to the same activities -- a
couple living together. Has "authority" just changed its form
as Engels argued? Of course not. There is a substantial
difference between the two. The former is authoritarian. One
part of the organisation dictates to the other. The latter is
libertarian as neither dominates (or they, as a couple,
"dominate" each other as individuals -- surely an abuse
of the language, we hope you agree!). Each part of the
organisation agrees to the decision. Do all these differences
just mean that we have changed name of "authority" or has
authority been abolished and liberty created? This was
the aim of Bakunin's terminology, namely to draw attention
to the qualitative change that has occurred in the social
relationships generated by the association of individuals
when organised in an anarchist way.
As such, Engels is confusing two radically different means
of decision making by arguing both involve subordination and
authority. The difference is clear: the former involves the
domination of an individual over another while the second
involves the "subordination" of individuals to the decisions
and agreements they make. The first is authority, the second
is liberty.
Therefore, the example of free love indicates that, for
anarchists, Engels arguments are simply pedantic sophistry.
It goes without saying that organisation involves co-operation
and that, by necessity, means that individuals come to agreements
between themselves to work together. The question is how do
they do that, not whether they do so or not. As such, Engels'
arguments confuse agreement with hierarchy, co-operation with
coercion. Simply put, the way people conduct joint activity
determines whether an organisation is libertarian or authoritarian.
That was why anarchists called themselves anti-authoritarians,
to draw attention to the different ways of organising collective
work.
In his campaign against anti-authoritarian ideas within the
First International, Engels asks in a letter written in
January 1872 "how do these people [the anarchists] propose
to run a factory, operate a railway or steer a ship without
having in the last resort one deciding will, without a
single management." [The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 729]
This, of course, can only be asked if Engels was totally
ignorant of Bakunin's ideas and his many comments supporting
co-operatives and workers' associations as the means by
which workers would "organise and themselves conduct the
economy without guardian angels, the state or their former
employers." Indeed, Bakunin was "convinced that the co-operative
movement will flourish and reach its full potential only in
a society where the land, the instruments of production,
and hereditary property will be owned and operated by the
workers themselves: by their freely organised federations
of industrial and agricultural workers." [Bakunin on
Anarchism, p. 399 and p. 400] Which means that Bakunin,
like all anarchists, was well aware of how a factory or
other workplace would be organised:
By October of that year, Engels had finally "submitted arguments
like these to the most rabid anti-authoritarians" who replied to
run a factory, railway or ship did require organisation "but here
it was not a case of authority which we confer on our delegates,
but of a commission entrusted!" Engels commented that the
anarchists "think that when they have changed the names of
things they have changed the things themselves." He, therefore,
thinks that authority "will . . . only have changed its form"
rather than being abolished under anarchism as "whoever mentions
combined action speaks of organisation" and it is not possible
"to have organisation without authority." [Op. Cit., p. 732 and
p. 731]
However, Engels is simply confusing two different things,
authority and agreement. To make an agreement with another
person is an exercise of your freedom, not its restriction.
As Malatesta argued, "the advantages which association and
the consequent division of labour offer" meant that humanity
"developed towards solidarity." However, under class society
"the advantages of association, the good that Man could
drive from the support of his fellows" was distorted and
a few gained "the advantages of co-operation by subjecting
other men to [their] will instead of joining with them."
This oppression "was still association and co-operation,
outside of which there is no possible human life; but it
was a way of co-operation, imposed and controlled by a few
for their personal interest." [Anarchy, p. 28] Anarchists
seek to organise association to eliminate domination. This
would be done by workers organising themselves collectively
to make their own decisions about their work (workers'
self-management, to use modern terminology).
As such, workers would organise their tasks but this did not
necessitate the same authoritarian social relationships as
exist under capitalism:
For a given task, co-operation and joint activity may be
required by its very nature. Take, for example, a train
network. The joint activity of numerous workers are
required to ensure that it operates successfully. The
driver depends on the work of signal operators, for
example, and guards to inform them of necessary information
essential for the smooth running of the network. The
passengers are dependent on the driver and the other
workers to ensure their journey is safe and quick. As
such, there is an objective need to co-operate but this
need is understood and agreed to by the people involved.
If a specific activity needs the co-operation of a number of
people and can only be achieved if these people work together
as a team and, therefore, need to make and stick by agreements,
then this is undoubtedly a natural fact which the individual
can only rebel against by leaving the association. Similarly,
if an association considers it wise to elect a delegate whose
tasks have been allocated by that group then, again, this
is a natural fact which the individuals in question have
agreed to and so have not been imposed upon the individual
by any external will -- the individual has been convinced
of the need to co-operate and does so.
Engels, therefore, confuses the authority of the current system,
organised and imposed from the top-down, with the self-management
required by a free society. He attempted to apply the same word
"authority" to two fundamentally different concepts. However,
we abuse words and practice deception when we apply the same
term to totally different concepts. As if the hierarchical,
authoritarian organisation of work under capitalism, imposed
by the few on the many and based by the absence of thought
and will of the subordinated, could be compared with the
co-ordination of joint activities by free individuals! What
is there in common with the authoritarian structure of the
capitalist workplace or army and the libertarian organisation
required by workers to manage their struggle for freedom and,
ultimately, to manage their own working activity? Engels
does damage to the language by using the same word
("authority") to describe two so radically different things
as the hierarchical organisation of wage labour and the free
association and co-operation of equals of self-management. If
an activity requires the co-operation of numerous individuals
then, clearly, that is a natural fact and there is not much
the individuals involved can do about it. Anarchists are not
in the habit of denying common sense. The question is simply
how do these individuals co-ordinate their activities. Is
it by means of self-management or by hierarchy (authority)?
As such, anarchists have always been clear on how industry
would be run -- by the workers' themselves in their own free
associations. In this way the domination of the boss would be
replaced by agreements between equals (see also sections
I.3.1 and
I.3.2 on how anarchists think workplaces will be
run in a free society).
Engels argued that large-scale industry (or, indeed, any
form of organisation) meant that "authority" was required.
He stated that factories should have "Lasciate ogni autonomia,
voi che entrate" ("Leave, ye that enter in, all autonomy
behind") written above their doors. Indeed, that is the
basis of capitalism, with the wage worker being paid to
obey. This obedience, Engels argued, was necessary even
under socialism, as applying the "forces of nature" meant
"a veritable despotism independent of all social organisation."
This meant that "[w]anting to abolish authority in large-scale
industry is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself."
[Op. Cit., p. 731]
The best answer to Engels claims can be found in the class
struggle. Given that Engels was a capitalist (i.e. an owner
of a factory), he may have not been aware of the effectiveness
of "working to rule" when practised by workers. This basically
involves doing exactly what the boss tells you to do, regardless
of the consequences as regards efficiency, production and so on.
Quite simply, workers' refusing to practice autonomy can be an
extremely effective and powerful weapon in the class struggle.
This weapon has long been used by workers and advocated by
anarchists, syndicalists and wobblies. For example, the IWW
booklet How to fire your boss argues that "[w]orkers often
violate orders, resort to their own techniques of doing things,
and disregard lines of authority simply to meet the goals of
the company. There is often a tacit understanding, even by
the managers whose job it is to enforce the rules, that these
shortcuts must be taken in order to meet production quotas
on time." They argue, correctly, that "if each of these rules
and regulations were followed to the letter" then "[c]onfusion
would result -- production and morale would plummet. And best
of all, the workers can't get in trouble with the tactic
because they are, after all, 'just following the rules.'"
The British anarcho-syndicalists of the Direct Action Movement
agree and even quote an industrial expert on the situation:
Another weapon of workers' resistance is what has been called
"Working without enthusiasm" and is related to the "work to
rule." This tactic aims at "slowing production" in order to
win gains from management:
The practice of "working to rule" and
"working without enthusiasm"
shows how out of touch Engels (like any capitalist) is with
the realities of shop floor life. These forms of direct action
is extremely effective because the workers refuse to act
autonomously in industry, to work out the problems they face
during the working day themselves, and instead place all the
decisions on the authority required, according to Engels, to
run the factory. The factory itself quickly grinds to a halt.
What keeps it going is not the "imperious" will of authority,
but rather the autonomous activity of workers thinking and
acting for themselves to solve the numerous problems they face
during the working day.
As Cornelius Castoriadis argues:
"Under 'normal' conditions of exploitation, workers are
torn between the need to organise themselves in this way
in order to carry out their work -- otherwise there are
repercussions for them -- and their natural desire to
do their work, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
awareness that by doing so they only are serving the
boss's interests. Added to those conflicting concerns
are the continual efforts of factory's management
apparatus to 'direct' all aspects of the workers'
activity, which often results only in preventing them
from organising themselves." [Political and Social
Writings, vol. 2, p. 68]
Needless to say, co-operation and co-ordination is required in
any collective activity. Anarchists do not deny this fact of
nature, but the example Engels considered as irrefutable simply
shows the fallacy of his argument. If large-scale industry
was run along the lines argued by Engels, it would quickly
grind to halt.
Ironically, the example of Russia under Lenin and Trotsky
reinforces this fact. "Administrative centralisation" was
enforced on the railway workers which, in turn, "led
more to ignorance of distance and the inability to
respond properly to local circumstances . . . 'I have no
instructions' became all the more effective as a defensive
and self-protective rationalisation as party officials vested
with unilateral power insisted all their orders be strictly
obeyed. Cheka ruthlessness instilled fear, but repression . . .
only impaired the exercise of initiative that daily operations
required." [William G. Rosenberg, "The Social Background to
Tsektran," Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War,
Diane P. Koenker, William G. Rosenberg and Ronald Grigor
Suny (eds.), p. 369] Without the autonomy required to manage
local problems, the operation of the railways was seriously
harmed and, unsurprisingly, a few months after Trotsky
subjected to railway workers to the "militarisation of
labour" in September 1920, there was a "disastrous collapse
of the railway network in the winter of 1920-1." [Jonathan
Aves, Workers against Lenin, p. 102]
As the experience of workers' in struggle shows, it is the
abolition of autonomy which means the abolition of
large-scale industry, not its exercise. This can be seen
from various forms of direct action such as "working to rule"
as well as Trotsky's attempts to impose the "militarisation
of labour" on the Russian workers. The conscious decision by
workers to not exercise their autonomy brings industry
grinding to a halt and are effective tools in the class
struggle. As any worker know, it is only their ability to
make decisions autonomously that keeps industry going.
Rather than abolishing authority making large-scale industry
impossible, it is the abolishing of autonomy which quickly
achieves this. The issue is how do we organise industry so
that this essential autonomy is respected and co-operation
between workers achieved based on it. For anarchists, this
is done by self-managed workers associations in which
hierarchical authority is replaced by collective self-discipline
(as discussed in section 12 of
the appendix on "What happened during the Russian Revolution?").
As noted in the
last section,
Engels argued that applying the
"forces of nature" meant "a veritable despotism independent
of all social organisation." This meant that "[w]anting to
abolish authority in large-scale industry is tantamount to
wanting to abolish industry itself." [Op. Cit., p. 731]
For anarchists, Engels' comments ignore the reality of class
society in an important way. Modern ("large-scale") industry
has not developed neutrally or naturally, independently of all
social organisation as Engels claimed. Rather it has been
shaped by the class struggle. As we argued in
section D.10,
technology is a weapon in the class struggle. As Castoriadis
argues:
"The workers are by no means helpless in this struggle.
They constantly invent methods of self-defence. They
break the rules, while 'officially' keeping them. They
organise informally, maintain a collective solidarity
and discipline." [The Meaning of Socialism, pp. 9-10]
As such, one of the key aspects of the class struggle
is the conflict of workers against attempts by management
to eliminate their autonomy within the production process.
This struggle generates the machines which Engels claims
produce a "veritable despotism independent of all social
organisation." Regardless of what Engels implies, the way
industry has developed is not independent of class society
and its "despotism" has been engineered that way. For
example, it may be a fact of nature that ten people may be
required to operate a machine, but that machine is not
such a fact, it is a human invention and so can be changed.
Nor is it a fact of nature that work organisation should be
based on a manager dictating to the workers what to do --
rather it could be organised by the workers themselves,
using collective self-discipline to co-ordinate their
joint effort.
As one shop steward put it, workers are "not automatons.
We have eyes to see with, ears to hear with, and mouths
to talk." As David Noble comments, "[f]or management
. . . that was precisely the problem. Workers controlled
the machines, and through their unions had real authority
over the division of labour and job content." [Forces
of Production, p. 37] This autonomy was what managers
constantly struggled against and introduced technology
to combat. As such, Engels' notion that machinery was
"despotic" hide the nature of class society and the fact
that authority is a social relationship, a relationship
between people and not people and things. And, equally,
that different kinds of authority meant different kinds
of organisation and different social relationships to do
the collective tasks. It was precisely to draw attention
to this that anarchists called themselves anti-authoritarians.
Clearly, Engels is simply ignoring the actual relations
of authority within capitalist industry and, like the
capitalism he claims to oppose, is raising the needs of
the bosses to the plane of "natural fact." Indeed, is
this not the refrain of every boss or supporter of
capitalism? Right-libertarian guru Ludwig von Mises
spouted this kind of refrain when he argued that
"[t]he root of the syndicalist idea is to be seen
in the belief that entrepreneurs and capitalists are
irresponsible autocrats who are free to conduct their
affairs arbitrarily. Such a dictatorship must not be
tolerated . . . The fundamental error of this argument
is obvious [sic!]. The entrepreneurs and capitalists are
not irresponsible autocrats. They are unconditionally
subject to the sovereignty of the consumers. The market
is a consumers' democracy." [Human Action, p. 814] In
other words, it is not the bosses fault work is so hard
or that they dictate to the worker. No, of course not,
it is the despotism of the machine, of nature, of the
market, of the customer, anyone and anything but
the person with authority who is actually giving
the orders and punishing those who do not obey!
Needless to say, like Engels essay, von Mises' argument
is fundamentally flawed simply because the boss is not
just repeating the instructions of the market (assuming
that it is a "consumers' democracy," which it is not).
Rather, they give their own instructions based on
their own sovereignty over the workers. The workers could,
of course, manage their own affairs and meet the demands
of consumers directly. The "sovereignty" of the market
(just like the "despotism" of machines and joint action)
is independent of the social relationships which exist
within the workplace, but the social relationships themselves
are not predetermined by them. Thus the same workshop can
be organised in different ways. As such, the way industry
operates is dependent on social organisation. The workers
can manage their own affairs or be subjected to the rule
of a boss. To say that "authority" still exists simply
means to confuse agreement with obedience.
The importance of differentiating between types of
organisation and ways of making decisions can be seen from
the experience of the class struggle. During the Spanish
Revolution anarchists organised militias to fight the fascists.
One was lead by anarchist militant Durruti. His military adviser,
Pérez Farras, a professional soldier, was concerned about the
application of libertarian principles to military organisation.
Durruti replied:
"I thought -- and what has happened confirms my belief -- that a
workingmen's militia cannot be led according to the same rules as
an army. I think that discipline, co-ordination and the fulfilment
of a plan are indispensable. But this idea can no longer be
understood in the terms of the world we have just destroyed.
We have new ideas. We think that solidarity among men must
awaken personal responsibility, which knows how to accept
discipline as an autonomous act.
"Necessity imposes a war on us, a struggle that differs from
many of those that we have carried on before. But the goal of our
struggle is always the triumph of the revolution. This means not
only victory over the enemy, but also a radical change in man.
For this change to occur, man must learn to live in freedom and
develop in himself his potentialities as a responsible individual.
The worker in the factory, using his tools and directing production,
is bringing about a change in himself. The fighter, like the
worker, uses his gun as a tool and his acts must lead to the
same goals as those of the worker.
"In the struggle he cannot act like a soldier under orders but
like a man who is conscious of what he is doing. I know it is not
easy to get such a result, but what one cannot get by reason, one
can never get through force. If our revolutionary army must be
maintained through fear, we will have changed nothing but the
colour of fear. It is only by freeing itself from fear that a
free society can be built." [quoted by Abel Paz, Durruti: The
People Armed, p. 225]
Is it really convincing to argue that the individuals who made
up the militia are subject to the same social relationships as
those in a capitalist or Leninist army? The same, surely, goes
for workers associations and wage labour. Ultimately, the
flaw in Engels' argument can be best seen simply because he
thinks that the "automatic machinery of a big factory is much
more despotic than the small capitalist who employ workers ever
have been." [Op. Cit., p. 731] Authority and liberty become
detached from human beings, as if authoritarian social
relationships can exist independently of individuals! It
is a social relationship anarchists oppose, not an
abstraction.
As such, Engels' argument is applicable to any society
and to any task which requires joint effort. If, for
example, a table needs four people to move it then those
four people are subject to the "despotism" of gravity!
Under such "despotism" can we say its irrelevant whether
these four people are slaves to a master who wants the
table moved or whether they agree between themselves to
move the table and on the best way to do it? In both
cases the table movers are subject to the same "despotism"
of gravity, yet in the latter example they are not
subject to the despotism of other human beings they
are subject to in the former. Clearly, Engels is playing
with words!
The fallacy of Engels' basic argument can be seen from
this simple example. He essentially uses a liberal
concept of freedom (i.e. freedom exists prior to society
and is reduced within it) when attacking anarchism. Rather
than see freedom as a product of interaction, as Bakunin
did, Engels sees it as a product of isolation. Collective
activity is seen as a realm of necessity (to use Marx's
phrase) and not one of freedom. Indeed, machines and the
forces of nature are considered by Engels' as "despots"!
As if despotism was not a specific set of relationships
between humans. As Bookchin argues:
Given this, it can be argued that Engels' "On Authority"
had a significant impact in the degeneration of the
Russian Revolution into state capitalism. By deliberately
obscuring the differences between self-managed and authoritarian
organisation, he helped provide Bolshevism with ideological
justification for eliminating workers self-management in
production. After all, if self-management and hierarchical
management both involve the same "principle of authority,"
then it does not really matter how production is organised
and whether industry is managed by the workers or by
appointed managers (as Engels stressed, authority in industry
was independent of the social system and all forms of
organisation meant subordination). Murray Bookchin draws
the obvious conclusion from Engels' (and Marx's) position:
"Obviously, the factory conceived of as a 'realm of necessity'
[as opposed to a 'realm of freedom'] requires no need
for self-management." [Op. Cit., p. 126]
Hence the Bolsheviks need not to consider whether replacing
factory committees with appointed managers armed with
"dictatorial powers" would have any effect on the position
of workers in socialism (after all, the were subject to
subordination either way). Engels had used the modern
factory system of mass production as a direct analogy
to argue against the anarchist call for workers' councils,
for autonomy, for participation, for self-management.
Authority, hierarchy, and the need for submission and
domination is inevitable given the current mode of
production, both Engels and Lenin argued. Little wonder,
then, the worker become the serf of the state (see
section 11 of the appendix
on "What happened during the Russian Revolution?"for more details).
In his own way, Engels
contributed to the degeneration of the Russian Revolution
by providing the rationale for the Bolsheviks disregard for
workers' self-management of production.
Simply put, Engels was wrong. The need to co-operate and
co-ordinate activity may be independent of social development,
but the nature of a society does impact on how this
co-operation is achieved. If it is achieved by hierarchical
means, then it is a class society. If it is achieved by
agreements between equals, then it is a socialist one. As
such, how industry operates is dependent on society it
is part of. An anarchist society would run industry based
on the free agreement of workers united in free associations
(see
section H.4.3).
This would necessitate making and
sticking to joint decisions but this co-ordination would be
between equals, not master and servant. By not recognising
this fact, Engels fatally undermined the cause of socialism.
H.4.1 Does organisation imply the end of liberty?
"To get the full meaning out of life we must co-operate, and
to co-operate we must make agreements with our fellow-men. But
to suppose that such agreements mean a limitation of freedom
is surely an absurdity; on the contrary, they are the exercise
of our freedom.
H.4.2 How does free love versus marriage indicate the weakness of Engels' argument?
H.4.3 How do anarchists propose to run a factory?
"Only associated labour, that is, labour organised upon the
principles of reciprocity and co-operation, is adequate to
the task of maintaining . . . civilised society." [The
Political Philosophy of Bakunin, p. 341]
"Of course in every large collective undertaking, a division
of labour, technical management, administration, etc., is
necessary. But authoritarians clumsily play on words to
produce a raison d'etre for government out of the very
real need for the organisation of work. Government . . .
is the concourse of individuals who have had, or have
seized, the right and the means to make laws and to oblige
people to obey; the administrator, the engineer, etc.,
instead are people who are appointed or assume the
responsibility to carry out a particular job and do
so. Government means the delegation of power, that is
the abdication of initiative and sovereignty of all into
the hands of a few; administration means the delegation of
work, that is tasks given and received, free exchange of
services based on free agreement. . . Let one not confuse
the function of government with that of administration,
for they are essentially different, and if today the two
are often confused, it is only because of economic and
political privilege." [Anarchy, pp. 39-40]
H.4.4 How does the class struggle refute Engels'
arguments that industry required leaving "all autonomy behind"?
"If managers' orders were completely obeyed, confusion would
result and production and morale would be lowered. In order to
achieve the goals of the organisation workers must often violate
orders, resort to their own techniques of doing things, and
disregard lines of authority. Without this kind of systematic
sabotage much work could not be done. This unsolicited sabotage
in the form of disobedience and subterfuge is especially necessary
to enable large bureaucracies to function effectively." [Social
Psychology of Industry by J.A.C. Brown, quoted in Direct Action
in Industry]
"Even the simplest repetitive job demands a certain minimum of
initiative and in this case it is failing to show any non-obligatory
initiative . . . [This] leads to a fall in production -- above all
in quality. The worker carries out every operation minimally;
the moment there is a hitch of any kind he [or she] abandons
all responsibility and hands over to the next man [or woman]
above him [or her] in the hierarchy; he works mechanically,
not checking the finished object, not troubling to regulate
his machine. In short he gets away with as much as he can,
but never actually does anything positively illegal." [Pierre
Dubois, Sabotage in Industry, p. 51]
"Resistance to exploitation expresses itself in a drop in
productivity as well as exertion on the workers' part . . .
At the same time it is expressed in the disappearance of
the minimum collective and spontaneous management and
organisation of work that the workers normally and of
necessity puts out. No modern factory could function for
twenty-four hours without this spontaneous organisation of
work that groups of workers, independent of the official
business management, carry out by filling in the gaps of
official production directives, by preparing for the
unforeseen and for regular breakdowns of equipment, by
compensating for management's mistakes, etc.
H.4.5 Is the way industry operates
"independent of all social organisation"?
"Management organises production with a view of achieving
'maximum efficiency.' But the first result of this sort of
organisation is to stir up the workers' revolt against
production itself . . . To combat the resistance of the
workers, the management institutes an ever more minute
division of labour and tasks . . . Machines are invented,
or selected, according to one fundamental criterion: Do
they assist in the struggle of management against workers,
do they reduce yet further the worker's margin of autonomy,
do they assist in eventually replacing him [or her]
altogether? In this sense, the organisation of production
today . . . is class organisation. Technology is
predominantly class technology. No . . . manager would
ever introduce into his plant a machine which would
increase the freedom of a particular worker or of a
group of workers to run the job themselves, even if
such a machine increased production.
"I have already said and I repeat; during all my life, I have
acted as an anarchist. The fact of having been given political
responsibility for a human collective cannot change my convictions.
It is under these conditions that I agreed to play the role
given to me by the Central Committee of the Militias.
"To Engels, the factory is a natural fact of technics, not
a specifically bourgeois mode of rationalising labour;
hence it will exist under communism as well as capitalism.
It will persist 'independently of all social organisation.'
To co-ordinate a factory's operations requires 'imperious
obedience,' in which factory hands lack all 'autonomy.'
Class society or classless, the realm of necessity
is also a realm of command and obedience, of ruler and
ruled. In a fashion totally congruent with all class
ideologists from the inception of class society, Engels
weds Socialism to command and rule as a natural fact.
Domination is reworked from a social attribute into a
precondition for self-preservation in a technically
advanced society." [Towards an Ecological Society,
p. 206]